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MORAL PRACTICES:  
 ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
JOSEPH HOOVER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Who has the authority to assign responsibility for international crimes? 
There is a simple answer: international tribunals, in particular the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Yet this obvious response obscures further questions 
regarding where the political authority to create international tribunals comes 
from, as well as the vital moral question regarding how courts are constituted as 
actors with the capacity to assign blame. In modern international politics, 
authority has traditionally rested with states, meaning that rightful legal 
institutions were created by states and justified by their consent.1 The ICC is 
granted authority in this way, because it was created through a treaty negotiated 
and signed by states.2 Such a procedural response, however, obscures as much 
as it reveals about the politics and morality of assigning responsibility for 
international crimes. Asking how a new international authority is constituted 
and justified as an actor with the political power to try state officials and other 
international criminals—and to thereby embody and defend supposedly 
emergent norms of global justice—is a more contentious, difficult question that 
takes us beyond questions of positive law. 
In international law, there is also an account of the law’s authority based on 
the moral claims it makes, which are intended to shape states and constrain 
their power.3 The ICC belongs to this tradition as well. The fundamental issue I 
want to explore in this article is how such moral authority is constituted in real-
world institutions, particularly the authority to assign responsibility for 
international crimes. This is a vital issue to consider if we want to understand 
the ICC, its limits, and its place in the changing world of contemporary 
international politics. From the beginning the idea of an international criminal 
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 1.  Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, International Legal Order as an Idea, 73 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 253 
(1979).  
 2.  Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court art. 126, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into 
force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3.  MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 184–85 (2005). 
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court was framed in legalistic terms, in both its founding and practical activities 
to date.4 Now that the ICC is in operation it actively claims authority through its 
defense of universal moral principles and pursuit of justice for victims of 
violence. On this basis, authority is granted to the institution because it 
embodies universal moral norms, which in turn constrain the actions of states, 
leading to the reform of international politics.5 Supporters of the ICC 
characterize the court as a victory of law over politics, and of morality over the 
self-interests of states.6 This account of the ICC’s authority leaves us with 
important issues to consider: How was such a victory for international law 
possible? What are the court’s prospects for continued success? Should we 
accept the claim that the ICC is a legal rather than political institution?7 
International courts are products of their time and place, created through 
political compromise, responsive to particular crises, and dedicated to the 
interests of particular actors.8 Despite rhetoric that insists that the ICC and 
other international tribunals are (or should be) legal rather than political 
institutions,9 a focus on the constitution of these courts reveals the way 
preexisting social practices and power hierarchies structure their work. Placing 
the ICC’s authority to assign responsibility in its social and political context 
complicates our understanding of such authority and enables important lines of 
criticism. I argue that rather than overcoming the politics of their creation, legal 
institutions are indelibly shaped by them, and rather than escaping politics, legal 
institutions like the ICC transpose politics into a legal register.10 These claims do 
not make the attribution of responsibility impossible but they do push us to 
consider the moral authority to make such attributions differently. The 
conventional account of moral authority is seen as the just application of 
rightful law, although the realities of politics may make the ideal exercise of that 
authority difficult.11 The goal, nonetheless, is to make the law as impartial and 
judicious as possible to ensure its separation from politics. An alternative way 
of understanding moral and legal authority is to acknowledge its political 
element, in the sense that the authority exercised is always the product of a 
 
 4.  M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 12–13 (1997). 
 5.  ADAM BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS: WAR AND INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN 
UGANDA 181–84 (2011) [hereinafter BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
 6.  Steven C. Roach, Value Pluralism, Liberalism, and the Cosmopolitan Intent of the International 
Criminal Court, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 475, 483–84 (2005). 
 7.  Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 942–46 (2010) [hereinafter Nouwen & 
Werner, Doing Justice to the Political]. 
 8.  David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 410–17 (2007). 
 9.  Alexander K. A. Greenwalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 586 (2007). 
 10.  GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME 23–29 (2007). 
 11.  Jamie Terence Kelly, The Moral Foundations of International Criminal Law, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 
502, 504 (2010). 
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decision to impose values upon others, which always remains a kind of violence 
because those decisions are never universally or finally justifiable, but rather 
are in some measure politically driven.12 
If we understand the capacity to assign moral responsibility as part of a 
social practice, it is vital to understand the background conditions that partly 
determine who can assume the privilege of assigning responsibility, while also 
considering the effects those privileged actors have as they exercise their 
authority. Understanding the assignation of responsibility as a social practice 
requires us to identify the social relationships through which a particular 
individual or institution gains the capacity to assign responsibility to culpable 
agents who are then subject to punishment. Taking this approach allows us to 
begin addressing the difficulty Jens Meierhenrich identifies in “attempting to 
disaggregate the first permanent international criminal court by scrutinizing 
various socially meaningful or otherwise significant aspects of its everyday 
life.”13 In international politics, the historically dominant practice has been one 
of “victor’s justice,” in which the authority of legal bodies and the punishments 
they hand down is given by the force of arms possessed by the victorious state.14 
This practice has always provoked opposition and for advocates of international 
criminal law the ICC represents a milestone in the long evolution from “victor’s 
justice” to true international justice, in which the rule of law rather than the rule 
of power becomes the basis for international politics.15 “The ICC reminds 
governments that realpolitik, which sacrifices justice at the altar of political 
settlements, is no longer accepted.”16 International criminal law seeks to 
reconstruct this practice of assigning responsibility by moving towards the 
effective rule of law and creating new moral actors, most vitally an independent 
international court. In this article I argue that the shift in the social practice of 
assigning responsibility that is sought through the ICC contains within it an 
impossible renunciation of politics. 
This shift in practice is explored by looking at the creation of the ICC. Using 
the history of the founding of this landmark institution I trace its limits, the 
power hierarchies that structure it as an actor capable of assigning 
responsibility, and its importance for the development of practices of 
international criminal law. The conclusion of this analysis is that the ICC, as a 
 
 12.  See generally LAW AND AGONISTIC POLITICS (Andrew Schaap ed., 2009).  
 13.  Jens Meierhenrich, The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 1, 4. 
 14.  JOHN LAUGHLAND, HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRIALS: FROM CHARLES I TO SADDAM 
HUSSEIN 252 (2008). 
 15.  Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 383–93 (2000). 
 16.  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman, Drafting Comm., United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Address at the Ceremony for the 
Opening of Signature of the Treaty on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, in THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xxi, xxi (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 1999). 
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moral agent, is limited by its inability to acknowledge its own political power, 
because its authority is premised on the separation of law and politics. As 
former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo described his role, 
I shall not be involved in political considerations . . . . It is the only way to build a 
judicial institution, to help the political actors to perceive the legal limits. To facilitate 
the work and planning of political actors, I inform them in advance of my next steps, 
and ensure that my Office be transparent and predictable. However, my duty is to 
apply the law without political considerations. Other actors have to adjust to the law.
17
 
This limitation in turn presents significant obstacles for the ICC’s goal of ending 
impunity and raises questions about the promise of international justice for 
those most directly affected by the conflicts where the ICC is involved. These 
negative consequences are seen in the court’s actions in Uganda, where its first 
arrest warrants were issued.18 
The ICC’s claim to authority rests on the renunciation of politics in favor of 
the power of the law, which is justified by the law’s moral quality. International 
criminal law’s moral quality is characterized by two distinct ends: first, the 
elimination of impunity for individuals with state position and power, which 
extends the rule of law to the international level, and second, responding to the 
suffering of victims of atrocity and war by bringing those responsible to justice, 
through punishment.19 These aims are intended to ensure the just application of 
universal moral principles. In the discussions and official drafting documents 
that led to the creation of the ICC, this moral authority was emphasized while 
political authority, associated with partiality, compromise, and impunity, was 
rejected.20 The difficulty this creates, and that is revealed when we think about 
moral responsibility as a social practice, is that moral authority is always tied up 
with other forms of social authority that must make use of coercion and 
compromise, and is unavoidably partial. In practice the ICC must be a political 
actor, but the way that its moral authority is constructed leads to a kind of 
schizophrenia. Even in the terms set out by the ICC’s own ideals for moral 
actors, the ICC is in practice inconsistent and contradictory. This can be seen in 
the Uganda case, where the ICC had strong pragmatic reasons for choosing to 
pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a first prosecution and to seek 
close cooperation with the Ugandan government. These political choices raise 
doubts about the ICC’s impartiality and capacity to serve the ends of 
 
 17.  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Keynote Address at Council on 
Foreign Relations 6 (Feb. 4, 2010) (transcript available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/ 
attachments/MorenoOcampo.CFR.2.4.2010.pdf). 
 18.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant 
of Arrest for Joseph Kony (Sept. 27, 2005), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf; Kony, Otti, 
Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya (July 8, 2005), 
http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.pdf; Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-
01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.pdf; 
Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.pdf. 
 19.  Rome Statute, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
 20.  MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
ACHIEVEMENT 129–30 (2006). 
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international justice.21 Although the authority of the ICC is articulated through 
the renunciation of politics, its exercise of authority is quintessentially political. 
The court not only was constituted by states and through a process of 
compromise and negotiation that has shaped it as an institution22 but also 
exercises its legal authority to make choices on matters beyond the law: who to 
prosecute, how conflicts are represented, and when to compromise to secure the 
cooperation of states.23 In the end, I want to claim that attending to how the 
ICC assigns responsibility in terms of social practice should lead us to 
reconsider the law–politics relationship sought by international criminal law. 
The agonistic character of international criminal law should be acknowledged. 
This agonistic character suggests that the law never escapes politics and that 
failing to embrace the political role of the ICC is damaging to this important 
institution, because disavowing politics lends itself to naivety and a lack of self-
criticism. 
There are a number of difficulties with the claims I am making here. First, 
how does the ICC act as a moral agent? Second, how can I justify the claim that 
the court is acting in the way I claim? Third, how can I show that the cause of 
the court’s action has to do with how the ICC is constructed as a moral agent? 
The truth is I cannot respond fully to these difficulties. In the first case, 
speaking of the ICC as a moral agent is necessarily a shorthand for speaking of 
the acts of individuals that take place within the ICC as an institution. In most 
instances, I am talking about the prosecutor at the time in question, Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, but this too is a simplification, given that those with whom he 
conferred surely shaped his actions and decisions. A further issue is that there is 
no record of his thoughts and actions, much less those of who he worked with—
the evidence available is very limited. Finally, with respect to the third 
difficulty, I am not claiming that the way the ICC was constructed as a moral 
agent is determinant, that it is a structural force bearing down on all those 
involved, but rather that the initial act of construction shapes and constrains the 
practice of the court and is important so far as we see the court’s claim to 
authority made in terms of a rejection of politics. This self-understanding means 
that the ICC struggles to be clear or open about its politics in its public 
pronouncements, and one suspects even internally, though this is hard to judge 
because of the lack of evidence. So, the argument presented here is not based in 
a deep and long term empirical engagement with the court as an institution 
simply because such work has not yet been done, though it is increasingly seen 
as important and being attempted.24 Rather, my claims are based on available 
 
 21.  BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 183–215. 
 22.  See Antonio Cassese, The Statue of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 170–71 (1999). 
 23.  Nouwen & Werner, Doing Justice to the Political, supra note 7, at 961–65. 
 24.  This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems represents a move in that direction, as is 
highlighted in Jens Meierhenrich’s The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, supra 
note 13, at 1–5. 
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textual evidence and a kind of conceptual analysis of the moral ideals that shape 
the court. In light of these limitations, my conclusions are suggestive rather than 
determinate. 
II 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE 
The link between morality and law is hardly simple or straightforward. 
There are those who see the law as grounded in effective political authority and 
its institutional execution, and for them moral claims are only ideological 
justifications of authority; morality does not have its own power.25 International 
criminal law starts from the opposing side of this claim. Its fundamental 
justification is that there are some wrongs that are undeniable and, in turn, 
norms that should be applicable everywhere.26 Assuming this link between 
morality and law, in which moral principle provides justification for the social 
power that the law exercises, the question of assigning moral responsibility 
becomes central. 
Moral theory, however, does not provide any one compelling understanding 
of responsibility. The question moral philosophy commonly confronts is, Can 
individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions?27 The typically 
modern response is that they can so long as they acted freely and were capable 
of knowing the morally right action.28 These presumptions are echoed in legal 
norms, such as actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (the act is not culpable 
unless the mind is guilty). This account of responsibility, in which moral 
culpability is constructed from causal responsibility and blameworthiness, treats 
responsibility as a quality of an individual actor. Philosophers have found two 
fundamental problems with this account. First, it depends on the reality of free 
will, because the responsible actor must be the cause of her own actions.29 
Second, it depends upon the universality of moral principles, which must be 
known to any right-minded individual.30 Both of these assumptions have proven 
problematic. 
There is not space here to go into the philosophical debates on moral 
responsibility, but neither is there any need to do so, because an identifiable 
 
 25.  See CHINA MIÉLVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295–320 (2005). 
 26.  David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International 
Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 571 (Samantha Besson & John 
Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
 27.  Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUD. 5, 5 (1994). 
 28.  MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 72–104 
(1992). 
 29.  Strawson, supra note 27, at 21–22. 
 30.  Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency, 74 PHIL. 311, 329 
(1999). 
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compatibilist compromise position has come to dominate.31 This compromise 
suggests that although individuals’ actions are in many ways determined by 
forces outside their control, individuals nonetheless maintain some capacity to 
direct their actions and choices. Further, whether we see moral norms as 
rational or conventional, there is an assumption that an individual can be 
expected to know and respect some moral norms, meaning that the assignation 
of responsibility is possible. What this compromise fails to account for is that 
assigning responsibility becomes a political act once we no longer see it as a 
discovery of a fact about the world. Rejecting the responsibility-as-fact concept 
is especially important for the compatibilist position, because that position 
acknowledges that both free will and moral principles are at least partly social 
constructions, in which someone exercises power over someone else. Yet, 
because this compromise position remains committed to the idea of 
responsibility as a quality that individuals possess, it is not clear where or how 
the political aspects of responsibility can be considered. 
It is for this reason that some scholars have moved to think of moral 
responsibility in different terms, namely as a social practice.32 This move is 
based in the idea that when we hold each other responsible we are not really 
concerned with larger philosophical questions of free will and rational morality, 
but with influencing the actions of others (and ourselves). Understanding 
responsibility as a social practice allows us to see how the act of holding each 
other accountable to social norms is rooted in particular contexts and always 
involves the exercise of power. The difficulties of dominant accounts of 
responsibility are only exacerbated when we consider international crimes 
involving collective actors and the mobilization of social groups.33 Therefore, it 
is this understanding of moral responsibility as a social practice that I want to 
use in thinking about the ICC and how it is able to claim the authority to hold 
individuals accountable. In arguing for a social practice account of responsibility 
I share the concern for moving beyond the impasse between theoretical 
abstraction and naïve empiricism that Meierhenrich expresses in his 
introduction to this issue, but I also stand slightly to the side of his central aim 
because my analysis remains explicitly normative.34 
In previous work, I have argued for an understanding of moral responsibility 
as a social practice rooted in John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy.35 The key 
 
 31.  Randolph Clarke, On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 29 MIDWEST 
STUD. PHIL. 13, 19–20 (2005). 
 32.  Responsibility has been addressed as a practice by those working in an Aristotelian tradition, 
such as Alasdair MacIntyre, supra note 30, as well as a pragmatic tradition, as in the work of Marion 
Smiley, supra note 28. Within contemporary moral philosophy, the work of Peter Strawson has been 
very influential in motivating this move to focus on the act of holding others accountable as a social 
practice. See PETER F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT, AND OTHER ESSAYS 1–28 (2008). 
 33.  See ANTHONY F. LANG, JR., PUNISHMENT, JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45–57 
(2008). 
 34.  See generally Meierhenrich, supra note 13. 
 35.  Joseph Hoover, Reconstructing Responsibility and Moral Agency in World Politics, 4 INT’L 
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points I want to bring out here are twofold. First, when we think of 
responsibility as a social practice the question of whether individuals possess 
free will, and therefore can be causally responsible for an act, is transformed 
into the question of whether individuals are enabled to be reflective in their 
actions and whether social conditions grant them the capacity to act 
purposefully. Second, thinking of responsibility as a social practice shifts our 
attention away from the question of whether a moral norm is universally 
binding as such and towards the question of the quality and consequences of the 
moral ends we pursue. Assigning responsibility, then, is the social practice of 
holding individuals to their proclaimed ends. Once we adopt this view, the task 
of morality is not to find agents who can be held responsible or determine the 
norms to which they must be accountable, but to consider the quality of our 
social practices and the consequence of the ends we pursue. 
A social-practice approach to responsibility brings the political elements of 
assigning blame and holding accountable to the fore, and a number of scholars 
have considered the distinctive difficulty of finding culpable agents when we are 
concerned with addressing “international” crimes. The account of responsibility 
that sees moral culpability as a quality that adheres to individuals cannot 
adequately address the reality of mass crimes in which whole populations can 
be seen as more or less culpable.36 For example, although soldiers may be 
responsible for particular atrocities, their actions are enabled by other collective 
actors, such as military leaders, state representatives, and democratic publics, 
who are thus in a way responsible as well.37 These moves to reconsider 
responsibility in world politics in terms of social practice are important, but they 
also understate the role of power in constituting culpable actors through the 
practices of international criminal law. Put another way, the focus on volitional 
individuals who commit heinous crimes is not only a conceptual mistake, but it 
also makes it all too easy to ignore structural causes of mass violence and the 
role that powerful international actors have in instigating and prolonging 
conflicts.38 
Paying attention to the construction of culpable agents, however, reveals 
only half of emerging practices of international responsibility. The actor who is 
able to assign responsibility, and in turn empowered to construct and limit 
which causes of conflict are to be addressed, is also socially constructed and 
defined by existing conditions and power hierarchies. So, whereas in previous 
work I have argued that accepting the idea of individual culpability in the 
practice of prosecuting international crimes obscures the social conditions that 
enable conflict and preserves the power inequalities that limit what the pursuit 
 
THEORY 233, 254–56 (2012). 
 36.  Kirsten Ainley, Excesses of Responsibility: The Limits of Law and the Possibilities of Politics, 
25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 407, 409 (2011). 
 37.  Neta C. Crawford, Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military 
Atrocity, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 187, 188–89 (2007). 
 38.  Hoover, supra note 35, at 252–54. 
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of international justice can achieve, in this article I focus on how the authority 
to hold responsible is constructed. To begin this work two things are needed: 
First, an account of what practices we are concerned with, and second, an 
understanding of what is meant by a social practice. 
The first concern is answered by looking to the emerging practices of 
international criminal law and the way that international courts are constituted. 
Courts deliver judgments of culpability based on the assignment of 
responsibility made by prosecutors. So, the moral question is, how are they 
justified? What gives legal institutions the authority to hold us responsible? 
These questions are answered in many different ways by competing accounts of 
the law, but my focus will be on the way the authority of international courts is 
justified in their founding documents and practices of prosecution. In this 
instance I am looking at the ICC as a landmark institution in the development 
of international criminal law because it is the first permanent international 
criminal court and as such its authority had to be explicitly justified at the time 
of its creation, and continues to be justified in practice. The work done here is 
only an initial opening, because digging into the full complexity of the practice 
of holding responsible at the ICC would require more extensive fieldwork. 
Although my analysis here falls short of Meierhenrich’s injunction to move 
from desk based research to field research, it does provide a framework for how 
scholars interested in distinctly moral practice might begin such work.39 How I 
judge the ICC requires more explanation, which is why I now turn to the 
question of how analyzing responsibility in terms of social practice enables us to 
evaluate the moral quality of our practices. 
In looking at responsibility as a social practice I draw on Dewey’s ethical 
thinking. Although Dewey did not use the language of practice in his ethics, he 
did set out a theory of ethics that was practical and social. Dewey suggested that 
the work of ethics begins with an understanding of how norms function socially 
and how ethical ideals are practically viewed within a society.40 Dewey’s notion 
of responsibility is focused on the importance of holding individuals 
accountable to social norms, while also encouraging moral reflection on both 
the means by which this work is done and the ethical ends society pursues.41 In 
this way, we can see Dewey as offering an account of responsibility as a social 
practice. An important part of the practice of responsibility is the institutional 
context in which society holds individuals responsible, notably considering who 
is able to hold others accountable and how such authority is granted and its 
social consequences. I want to suggest that we can use Dewey’s ethical theory to 
develop a practical method for analyzing the value of the ICC as an institution 
with the authority to assign responsibility. 
 
 39.  Meierhenrich, supra note 13, at 4–5. 
 40.  JOHN DEWEY, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 1900–1901, at 88–92 (1991). 
 41.  JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 315–18 (2002). 
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Dewey’s method of ethical intelligence begins with identifying a problematic 
situation, looking for the practical concern to which ethical and political action 
responds.42 In the case of the ICC we can consider both the perceived need for 
such a court, which is a central part of its justification, as well as the problems 
generated by the court’s actions. The ICC was created as a response to the 
commission of atrocities worldwide, and particularly as a way to end the 
impunity many perpetrators of atrocity enjoyed. Criticism of the court has 
focused on whether it has been able to effectively achieve its ends and whether 
it is sufficiently attentive to the victims of atrocity.43 To evaluate the court and 
the criticisms leveled against it, we can follow Dewey’s general approach. 
First, consideration should be given to the context in which the ICC was set 
up, including its aims and means, as well as the social and political dynamic in 
which the court was created. This analysis also includes a consideration of 
historical context, considering how the ICC responds to and embodies existing 
practices. Second, this analysis should look to how well the professed aims of 
the court are met by the prescribed means, giving special attention to 
unexpected consequences. This reflection is important for tracing the width of 
the gap that can open up between the aims of an institution and the 
consequences of its practical action. Importantly, this gap can appear even in 
cases where the aims and means are pursued sincerely and effectively, because 
practical action to address a problem, like international impunity, can alter our 
overall evaluation of the aims towards which a particular moral practice is 
oriented. After a reflective analysis of the practice of the court, a Deweyan 
approach asks us to evaluate the institution and practice in question, in terms of 
whether it achieves its ends and the consequences of its activities. This process 
of valuation is always done with more general moral values in mind and should 
focus on the wider consequence of a particular institution or practice. In this 
case, does the ICC make world politics more just or peaceful by some measure, 
and how does it affect the social and political relationships between the actors 
involved? In my own analysis I focus on whether the ICC is an authority that 
enables effective responses to atrocity and to what extent it engenders greater 
equality and control for those who suffer those atrocities. Finally, a valuation of 
the ICC provides a basis to suggest further reconstruction and, most 
importantly, further practical action to improve upon the failings of the court. 
In evaluating the ICC as an institution with the authority to assign 
responsibility, I consider both the founding of the court and its first arrest 
warrants, applying a pragmatic method of analysis to both grasp the practices of 
responsibility that the court is a part of, and to consider its achievements and 
limitations. 
 
 
 42.  See JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 107–23 (2004). 
 43.  David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 118, 119 
(2011). 
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III 
THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The creation of the ICC was something of a surprise. Supporters of the idea 
of a permanent international criminal court had struggled for years to generate 
interest and support for such a court.44 It is clear that in historical perspective 
the ICC is a response to the need to address the impunity of those who commit 
atrocities and an important component of an international legal system that 
protects universal human rights and seeks justice for the victims of atrocity. 45 
What is less clear is why in 1998 the ICC was seen as a necessary institution, 
even among states whose sovereign authority would be undermined by the 
court. There is a simple and comforting story that could be told about the 
advance of international law and human-rights norms in the post–Cold War era, 
but this would obscure more than it illuminates. Rather, I want to suggest there 
were a number of different actors who were supportive of the court, and each 
for rather different reasons. 
First, there were individual advocates for an international criminal court 
(academics, lawyers, politicians, and activists) who were able to put the idea 
back on the agenda at the UN and proved instrumental in garnering support 
from states and global civil society. Second, the UN itself, particularly the 
International Law Commission (ILC) and the General Assembly (GA), was 
supportive of the idea of a permanent court that could not only bring 
enforcement powers to bear in defense of the international legal norms, but 
could also relieve some of the strain that the organization faced in trying to 
respond to atrocities in an ad hoc manner. Third, an increasing number of states 
were sympathetic to the idea, both to develop humanitarian and human rights 
law, and to defer some of the responsibility and cost of responding to atrocities 
to an international institution. Finally, global civil society, particularly the 
coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that became known as the 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), was able to mobilize 
wider sentiment in favor of the court and advocate for its necessity as an 
institution that could alter international politics by enforcing international law 
in service of moral ends. The diversity of reasons why the court was seen as a 
necessary project is important because even while the synergy of interests 
helped bring it to realization, the divergence in how the court was envisioned 
reveals how the ICC embodies competing projects and was defined from the 
beginning by political calculations. 
 
 
 44.  Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two 
Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 3–4 
(1999). 
 45.  See generally Herman von Hebel, An International Criminal Court – A Historical Perspective, 
in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS 
13 (Herman A. M. Hebel, Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., 1999). 
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Trinidad’s Prime Minister Arthur Robinson, along with Robert Woetzel, 
Ben Ferencz, and M. Cherif Bassiouni, initiated the GA request for a draft 
statute of a permanent international criminal court from the ILC.46 Originally, 
the proposal was framed as a way of dealing with the specific crime of drug 
trafficking, but those involved ensured that the wording was left broad, so that 
other crimes could eventually be included.47 The passage of the resolution was, 
however, hardly a guarantee that anything substantive would come out of the 
discussions with the ILC. Bassiouni was particularly influential in the process, 
setting up an informal group of experts that provided its own draft statute,48 
stepping in as chairman of the ILC after the first chairman quit, and securing 
outside resources for the project.49 Creating a permanent international court 
was a lifelong goal for Bassiouni and he did much intellectual and practical 
work to make it a reality.50 Looking at the importance of individuals reveals 
that, although the ICC is by no means the work of one man, it is nonetheless a 
highly idealistic institution supported by the conviction of particular individuals 
as much as it is by states or a wider community concerned with the development 
of international criminal law.51 
Other important individuals include Adriaan Bos,52 who chaired the 
Preparatory Committee meetings that laid the groundwork for the Rome 
Conference, and Philippe Kirsch, who was the chairman at the Rome 
Conference.53 In both cases, the individual commitment and political skill of 
these men ensured that the creation of the court was neither delayed nor 
undermined by powerful state interests. They were vital to maintaining the 
momentum of the drafting as it went from being yet another proposal at the 
ILC to a treaty approved at the Rome Conference. William Pace, who led the 
CICC, was another individual who shaped the drafting process and the 
constitution of the ICC. He was essential in engaging global civil-society actors 
and coordinating their contributions, which included providing technical 
assistance to states, mobilizing public sympathy, and galvanizing support from a 
broad spectrum of NGOs.54 This shows how the court was partly a response to a 
problem perceived more by individuals than international institutions, states, or 
the wider public. Further, the leadership of these individuals influenced the 
aims and means adopted by the ICC, grounding its authority in moral terms and 
 
 46.  GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 10–11. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute: International Criminal Tribunal, in THE STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 759, 759–93 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999). 
 49.  GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 12. 
 50.  Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 9–10. 
 51.  Id. at 8–10. 
 52.  Christopher Keith Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 125 (1998). 
 53.  Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 27–28. 
 54.  GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 26–27. 
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focusing on the court’s potential to transform international politics.55 Their 
emphasis on the independence of the court and its potential to undermine 
traditional notions of sovereignty, however, challenges the authority of the 
states that the court depends on practically to do its business. 
These influential individuals, however, were hardly operating in a vacuum. 
An international criminal court had first been on the UN agenda in 1948, at the 
time of the passage of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, when the plan for such a court was first referred to the ILC 
for consideration.56 The ILC helped to develop the legal thinking that went into 
the ICC57 and kept the hope for a court alive while it was a political 
impossibility.58 Additionally, the GA’s support was influential, particularly in 
insulating the court from the interests of the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC).59 So, even while the initiation of the drafting process 
was left up to the effort of dedicated individuals, the UN provided an 
institutional space in which the court was seen as a way to fulfill the 
organization’s mission of protecting human rights while ensuring international 
peace and security. 
The sense of urgency and possibility around the drafting of the ICC had 
something to do with events at the UN. As the organization’s activities 
expanded with the end of the Cold War and it was called upon to respond to 
humanitarian crises and human-rights abuses, the need for a permanent court 
increased.60 This should not, however, be taken to show that the UN’s actions 
were purely moral—particularly among UNSC members, part of the appeal of a 
permanent international court was that it would ease the burden of responding 
to international crises in an ad hoc way, both by building up a reliable 
infrastructure and passing some of the responsibility to a new institution.61 The 
 
 55.  See generally William R. Pace, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and 
Non-Governmental Organizations, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS, supra note 45, at 189. 
 56.  Hebel, supra note 45, at 21–26. 
 57.  See generally Rep. of the Expert Grp. to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and 
Functioning of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Int’l Tribunal for 
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Expert Group]; Study on Ways 
and Means of Ensuring the Implementation of International Instruments Such as the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Including the 
Establishment of the International Jurisdiction Envisaged by the Convention, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Ad Hoc Working Grp. of Experts & Special Comm. Against Apartheid, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1426 (Jan. 19, 1981); Rep. of the 1953 Comm. on Int’l Criminal Jurisdiction, July 27–Aug. 20, 
1953, U.N. Doc. A/2645; GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (1954) (containing draft of Rome statute); 
Rep. of the Comm. on Int’l Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 1–31, 1951, annex I, U.N. Doc. A/2136; GAOR, 
7th Sess., Supp. No. 11 (1952) (containing draft of Rome statute). 
 58.  Hebel, supra note 45, at 26–27. 
 59.  Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 23–24. 
 60.  Bassiouni, supra note 4Error! Bookmark not defined., at 55–59. 
 61.  Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 167, 169–70 (1995). 
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UN’s role reveals another important tension at the heart of the ICC: Although 
there was a real commitment to the development of international criminal law, 
there was also a political goal of transferring responsibility, as much as 
authority, to an institution with potentially very little power to effectively 
enforce the law. 
Perhaps the most surprising feature of the drafting of the ICC was that so 
many states were supportive. This support, however, was characterized by 
important tensions. There were a number of states that were committed to the 
idea of a permanent and independent court. Eventually becoming known as the 
like-minded group (LMG), the states involved expanded throughout the 
drafting process and supported the court in hopes of building the rule of law 
internationally, spurred on by atrocities seen in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, as well as a sense of completing the institutional protection for human 
rights originally envisioned in 1948.62 Within the LMG there was important 
variation. The group included European states long committed to the 
development of international law (such as the Netherlands and Germany), 
states from the global south keen to support a court they hoped would be 
independent from the UNSC and the influence of powerful states (especially in 
South America and Africa), and states more recently convinced of the need for 
an international court (such as the United Kingdom, which joined late in the 
process on the back of the developing consensus and changes in domestic 
leadership).63 These states cooperated with global civil-society actors, fought to 
preserve the independence of the ICC from the UNSC, worked to establish the 
independence of the court’s prosecutor, and insisted on a wider jurisdiction 
than some would have preferred. 
Although the LMG proved that the court had support from states, many 
others were less supportive. Yet, despite their reticence, there were few serious 
attempts by powerful states to obstruct the drafting process. This is in part due 
to the political events at the time. High-profile atrocities had made the issue of 
responding to such events an issue that was hard to ignore.64 The success of the 
ICC was partly due to circumstances. Its necessity and the moral imperative for 
reform were strengthened by events rather than the concentrated efforts of 
individuals or states. The lack of resistance was also political. In particular, the 
United States offered cautious support for the project, not wanting to appear 
callous in the face of atrocities, and also convinced that a permanent 
international court with limited powers could prove useful for states, providing 
a minimally demanding way of responding to events.65 Even countries that had 
never signed the Rome Statute (and still have not) like India, Russia, and China 
involved themselves in the negotiations, seeking to shape rather than simply 
 
 62.  Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 20–21. 
 63.  GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 49–51. 
 64.  Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 3–4. 
 65.  Id. at 17. 
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oppose the court.66 In the end, the political context of the ICC’s creation has 
engendered persistent tensions: First, there remain important inequalities 
between supportive states, particularly between European states who provide a 
good deal of the financial backing to the court and African states who are thus 
far the only states being investigated; second, powerful states that are not party 
to the Rome Statute (especially the permanent members of the UNSC), 
continue to use the court for their own ends, which may have little to do with 
expanding the rule of law or seeking justice for victims of atrocity.67 
There was also a counterpressure coming from global civil society, which 
opposed the instrumentalization of the court by states. Operating under the 
CICC, civil-society groups represented a wider concern than that of specific 
individuals or the UN. Supportive groups came to the drafting process with a 
number of concerns, though human-rights advocacy and international-law 
groups were dominant. What united them was a desire for a court independent 
of state control.68 Judging the impact of global civil society is complex, because 
although there is a consensus that the efforts of the CICC to provide 
information and advocacy were fundamental to the success of the Rome 
Statute, the ends of those involved were hardly homogenous.69 Global civil 
society’s importance shows that the ICC was seen as a necessary institution by a 
relatively large number of people. This gives some credence to claims that the 
court represents the interests of humanity. However, such statements elide the 
partiality of the groups most involved, who tended to be from wealthy Western 
countries and who can hardly be said to unequivocally or unproblematically 
speak on behalf of “humanity.”70 
There were many different reasons for supporting the creation of the ICC, 
such that the court was not a single response to a single problem. Yet as the 
statute of the ICC was drafted and the institution came into being, an account 
of the aims and means of the court was needed.71 Keeping the context of the 
process in mind, we can see that the stated aims of the court obscure as much as 
they reveal. The drafting process and the documents produced therein gave rise 
to rhetoric of common endeavor, which is laid out in the ends the court claims 
to serve. The extreme and pervasive violence of the twentieth century, enabled 
by a lawless international order and the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators, are 
designated as the problem the court is responding to, giving rise to its necessity. 
In order to respond to the violence and impunity of international politics, the 
 
 66.  Id. at 17–19. 
 67.  Mark Kersten, A Fatal Attraction? The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P 
and the International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (Jeff 
Handmaker & Karin Arts eds., forthcoming 2014). 
 68.  GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 27. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Marlies Glasius, What is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and Victim Responses 
to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 496 (2009). 
 71.  Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 33–34. 
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ICC resolves to hold those most responsible for international crimes 
accountable to the international community, and in doing so to bring justice to 
the victims and deter future violence.72 These are the ethical aims of the ICC, 
the ends to which it is dedicated in principle and practice. Importantly, these 
aims provide the deeper justification for the court’s authority, beyond the 
agreement of the states that signed the Rome Statute. 
The means for achieving these ends are set out in the ICC’s founding 
document, which is focused on the need to extend the rule of law to the 
international level and to punish those responsible for atrocities. These 
intertwined projects of improving the procedures of international criminal law, 
moving away from “victor’s justice,” and punishing responsible individuals, 
were seen as vital to achieving the court’s aims.73 Central to this work is 
maintaining the separation of law from politics, because the court’s means of 
achieving its ends are premised on the neutrality and fairness of the legal 
process as well as the justness of the punishments imposed. Although the aims 
and means of the court fit well together in official statements, there are real 
problems with the details of its practice. 
The ICC claims to promote the rule of law by being a court of last resort, 
stepping in when states are unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes of 
international concern, but this much-discussed principle of complementarity 
says little about the standards that must be met by domestic prosecutions to 
pass the threshold of being able to prosecute crimes.74 This creates a problem 
because nearly any minimally legal proceeding would seem to circumvent the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, making it very difficult for the ICC to pursue cases where 
states are unwilling to prosecute cases in a thorough and rigorous way, 
especially if those states are powerful.75 Further, by not having a clear measure 
of competency, the ICC is open to manipulation by states that invoke the ICC’s 
jurisdiction for their own political gain rather than out of any real inability to 
conduct a domestic trial. For weaker states the ICC can provide legitimacy to 
the government and improve the state’s ability to gain assistance from other 
states and international institutions, because working with the ICC can be used 
to show concern for international law and a willingness to follow international 
norms.76 
Within the idea of complementarity we find one of the big difficulties the 
ICC faces: Its authority is drawn from its ability to enforce the rule of law upon 
state representatives, but the practice of the court protects the power of states. 
 
 72.  See Rome Statute, supra note 2, at pmbl, arts. 1, 5 & 27. 
 73.  Cassese, supra note 22, at 170–71. 
 74.  Id. at 158–59. 
 75.  Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 17, ¶ 2 (setting out the definition of unwilling, which is not 
very demanding and allows a lot of scope for interpretation). 
 76.  See Sarah Nouwen & Wouter Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals, in COLLECTIVE 
VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 255, 257–60 (Alette Smeulers ed., 2010) 
[hereinafter Nouwen & Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals]. 
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The idea of complementarity leaves the meaning and quality of domestic law to 
states at the same time that the court claims to be the embodiment of a 
universal law.77 A successful court, short of being one with no cases (as Ocampo 
famously said),78 is one whose authority is not coercive, such that states either 
try cases domestically or willingly submit cases to the ICC via referrals from 
state parties or the UNSC. In practice, even proprio motu referrals depend 
upon cooperation, either of the state under investigation, or of states powerful 
enough to force the offending state to comply. One could accept this limitation 
more sanguinely if the court were dedicated to improving the quality of 
domestic courts and building the capacity of states to uphold the rule of law—
even though in this case the ICC would look less like an independent 
international court and more like a conventional international institution 
focused on capacity building. 
The issue of punishment is also troubling because its justification is unclear 
and its effectiveness is hard to confirm. If the point of punishment is deterrence, 
then the ICC is undermined by its dependence on states to enforce its arrest 
warrants. (It has no independent power in such matters, a point made clear 
when President Omar Al Bashir travelled to Chad79 and Kenya80—both parties 
to the ICC—without incident.) Further, the evidence that the threat of 
prosecution can deter international crime is questionable. It is not clear how the 
threat of prosecution is effectively communicated and whether it changes the 
calculations of those committing atrocities in contexts of mass violence.81 Other 
justifications for punishment are likewise problematic. The sentences the court 
is able to hand out may not be appropriately retributive for the crimes it 
pursues, if any prison sentence could be for acts of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.82 The ICC’s first conviction tells the story. Thomas 
Lubanga was convicted for war crimes relating to the use of child soldiers in his 
militia, but was sentenced to only fourteen years with time served, meaning he 
will be free in eight years.83 In such a case it is hard not to feel that Ocampo has 
oversold his accomplishment when he says, “An international court investigated 
 
 77.  Cassese, supra note 22, at 159. 
 78.  OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 4 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf. 
 79.  Mariana Rodriguez Pareja, Al-Bashir to Visit Chad… Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 
2013, 12:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mariana-rodriguez-pareja/albashir-to-visit-chad-
ag_b_2750846.html. 
 80.  Court Worry at Omar Al-Bashir’s Kenya Trip, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2010, 8:09 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11117662. 
 81.  Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of the International Justice, 24 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191, 192–93 (2010). 
 82.  Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
561, 579 (2002). 
 83.  DR Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, BBC NEWS, (Jul. 10, 2012, 12:38 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726. 
7 HOOVER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:33 AM 
280 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:263 
 
the suffering of some of the most vulnerable members of humanity - children in 
war zones . . . . The court provided a fair trial to the suspect and convicted him. 
It is a victory for humanity.”84 Ocampo’s comments also highlight the difficulty 
of knowing for whom the ICC prosecutes. Punishment is meted out in an 
international space and to international standards, severing the link between 
punishment and the society and individuals affected. However much we may 
want to put convictions in context and see it as one step in a larger process, the 
victory for humanity and for those affected by violence in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) is modest. 
The aim of holding the perpetrators of atrocity to account is obviously 
appealing, but again the ICC runs into serious practical problems on this point. 
Although the court claims political independence, it not only is dependent upon 
the willingness of states to apprehend suspects but also is pursuing a political 
project of its own that may have very little to do with the victims affected by 
violence. The issue of punishment highlights this point: When the ICC is 
operating effectively it should remove an individual suspect from the society in 
which his alleged crimes are committed, taking him to The Hague to stand trial 
before an international panel of judges and, if convicted, sentencing him 
according to international standards, and holding him in custody in a foreign 
country. Whatever one thinks of the merits of this project, the court does not 
adequately acknowledge its politics on this point. The implicit idea is that the 
international community, referred to in the abstract as “humanity,” has priority 
in seeking punishment and in finding justice.85 Further, by focusing on the acts 
of individuals the ICC presents a very limited view of the causes of conflict, one 
that also happens to excuse systemic causes and the influences of outside 
institutions and states. We need not attribute malicious motives to the court’s 
political project for this to be problematic. The ICC’s project is played out in an 
existing context in which powerful states are able to influence the court’s 
actions, which suggests that there are deep reasons why it has tended to focus 
on weak African countries, lending credence to the complaint that the ICC is a 
court for European states to put African leaders on trial.86 This is a disturbing 
possibility given the stated aims of the ICC. 
The concerns discussed thus far regarding the constitution of the ICC’s 
authority to hold individuals responsible have been conceptual, looking at how 
the competing motivations that led to the creation of the court and the way in 
which its stated aims and means create problems for the court in practice. 
Following a Deweyan line of analysis, it is important to look at the 
consequences of the ICC’s practical activity to judge how far the concerns 
 
 84.  Henry Ridgwell, Lubanga Conviction Boosts ICC – But Weaknesses Remain, VOICE OF AM. 
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/lubanga-conviction-boosts-icc---but-weaknesses-
remain-142819925/181219.html. 
 85.  SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 14 (2006). 
 86.  Kurt Mills, “Bashir is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 404, 432–33 (2012). 
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raised thus far have proven warranted, as well as to consider ways in which the 
moral ends and practices of the court might be reconstructed. To do this fully 
would require far more space than is available here, so I focus on the ICC’s first 
arrest warrants, issued for Joseph Kony and other leaders of the LRA to give 
some indication of the moral issues the ICC faces. 
The key issue I want to focus on is how the authority of the ICC is premised 
on its abdication of politics—refusing to admit its political power and role—and 
claiming of authority through the nonpolitical moral and legal ends pursued. 
Yet politics is central to the court’s actions; It must choose whom to prosecute, 
draw distinctions between worthy victims, and distinguish the most culpable 
perpetrators. The court will inevitably make compromises and exert its power 
in potentially violent ways, and it must also seek favor with other interested 
actors, such as the United States or the UNSC. Therefore, the ICC’s disavowal 
of politics is potentially limiting. The ICC risks being ineffective and 
manipulated by other political actors if it is naïve on these matters. More 
importantly, the court’s failure to recognize or acknowledge its own political 
power means that the depoliticization brought about by its appeal to moral and 
legal authority is obscured, potentially hiding negative consequences such as the 
court’s tendency to disempower victims and act as a judicial institution of the 
strong to be used against the weak. These issues are explored in more depth 
with regards to the ICC’s actions in Uganda. 
IV 
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY: UGANDA AND THE ICC 
Given the importance of appearing to uphold the neutrality of the law and 
the universality of its moral ends, the ICC faced more difficulty than a normal 
court in choosing its first cases. The first case the court pursued was going to be 
a test for the new institution. It would be a response to questions of whether the 
ICC could function independently and whether new forms of international 
justice were possible. In the end, the ICC had a number of cases to choose from 
as states began to refer cases to the court very quickly.87 This act of choosing 
was the first exercise of the court’s political as well as moral and legal authority. 
At first glance, the referral of the LRA from the Ugandan government to the 
ICC seemed an obvious choice. The Ugandan government was supportive of 
the investigation, the United States was not going to block the referral despite 
its assistance to Uganda, and the persons accused were notorious for the 
brutality in the long-running Ugandan civil war.88 Joseph Kony made an 
excellent target for prosecution, his atrocities were shocking and well known, 
and he was unquestionably the most important leader in the LRA. Therefore, 
Uganda fit the ends of the court quite well. Court officials hoped that bringing 
 
 87.  Nouwen & Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals, supra note 76, at 255–57. 
 88.  TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S 
RESISTANCE ARMY 82–83 (2006). 
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top LRA leaders to justice would not only punish these criminals and deter 
future violence from rebel groups in the country, but also contribute to the 
peace process and providing a sense of closure for the LRA’s victims.89 Being 
able to frame their first case in these terms allowed the court, and its 
prosecutor, to act on the declared ends of the court without offering much 
reason for concern regarding the possibility of unexpected negative 
consequences. 
What this focus on the ideal qualities of the Uganda case obscures is that 
this was also a decision that was deeply political. The ICC could have started 
elsewhere and they could have handled the proceedings differently. It is a 
common refrain from the ICC that their choice of cases are dictated by the 
interests of justice, not political calculations about what is best for the court, but 
that plea is unconvincing.90 The ICC makes important decisions about whether a 
case is sufficiently grave to warrant their intervention and distinguishes between 
perpetrators who are more or less responsible, meaning the court must make 
decisions about the nature of the atrocities being committed and their cause. 
There are no clear guidelines on how these decisions are made and little record 
of the reasoning used by the prosecutor. Also, the decisions the ICC makes 
have consequences on those most directly affected by the events they are 
investigating, but the court prioritizes prosecution (in the name of justice) over 
concerns about peace and reconciliation, or relief for victims, despite having 
discretion on these matters in principle.91 These problems are not fatal to the 
court’s worth, or its moral quality. The legal process itself can address them to 
some degree, which will be seen in what follows. The central point, however, is 
that the court is a political actor, it makes distinctions and wields power that not 
only go beyond the law but also reveal that the appeal to law and morality is 
itself political. 
In publically denying its political power and the importance of political 
calculations to its work, the ICC risks complicity with the very state authority it 
claims to constrain. This complicity is evidenced by Ocampo’s appearance with 
Ugandan President Museveni in London in January 2004 for the announcement 
of the ICC’s investigation in Uganda.92 That moment conveyed the message that 
the ICC would not be investigating the government for potential crimes, despite 
accusations that the army had committed atrocities in northern Uganda and 
that the Ugandan government had supported rebel groups operating in the 
DRC. The court’s defense has been that it is focused on the most serious 
crimes, but again how this is determined is not known and the pressures to work 
 
 89.  BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 184–85. 
 90.  Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of 
Accountability in Uganda and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 682–83 (2009).  
 91.  OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/772c95c9-f54d-4321-bf09-73422bb23528/143640/ 
iccotpinterestsofjustice.pdf. 
 92.  Peskin, supra note 90, at 655–57. 
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closely with the Ugandan government are substantial.93 First, the court is 
dependent upon the government for access to Uganda, without which 
investigations would have been impossible. Also, the court needs state support 
if it hopes to apprehend Kony and the other suspects; this effort has required 
cooperation from the Ugandan military. Beyond these practical reasons for 
cooperating with the government there is also the political message to be 
communicated that the ICC is not a threat to its supporters, reassuring them 
that bringing a case to the ICC will not result in the referring state finding itself 
under investigation. In Uganda we can see how this was good for both the 
government and the court: The ICC got its first case, helping it to establish its 
legitimacy, while the Ugandan government received international legitimacy 
and assistance in defeating its political opponents. 
In terms of pursuing its stated moral aims, the ICC’s complicity with the 
Ugandan government is troubling because the court’s moral authority is based 
on its claim to end impunity and serve the interests of victims, both of which are 
compromised. It was originally thought that self-referrals would be rare at the 
ICC,94 because it was assumed that states would not want to allow an 
international court to try their nationals, much less to potentially investigate 
their government. But this assumption only holds if the court does not 
compromise and maintains the separation of law and politics. The court’s 
compromise and corresponding failure to attend to government atrocities in 
Uganda suggests that the court serves the interest of the government and of 
itself, not the interest in the rule of law or in the needs of victims. The rule of 
law is compromised because it is applied unequally (to the LRA leaders but not 
the government troops) and the needs of victims are compromised because the 
ends of legitimizing the ICC and securing the Ugandan government against its 
enemies are prioritized over putting an end to violence or taking care of the 
victims. Part of the problem in this instance is that the ICC has seemed 
unprepared for the political purposes that states would seek to serve by 
engaging with the court, which suggests that they have been naïve in not 
anticipating the political benefit states would find in bringing cases to the ICC. 
Uganda’s government was able to garner military assistance, curry international 
favor, and marginalize its enemies by using the moral authority of the ICC. The 
court has seemed either unwilling to recognize or unwilling to accept this 
conclusion.95 
The problem, however, goes deeper. The court is set up in such a way that if 
it were to act against the interests of states, it would struggle to be effective. 
Despite the moral justifications for the court’s authority, which speak of a law 
that transcends state sovereignty, the court is thoroughly deferential to states. 
The principle of complementarity gives the first right and responsibility of 
 
 93.  Id. at 678–89. 
 94.  Nouwen & Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals, supra note 76. 
 95.  Nouwen & Werner, Doing Justice to the Political, supra note 7, at 948. 
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prosecution to states,96 and the focus on individuals diverts attention away from 
institutional and social causes of violence.97 This reflects a wider failure of the 
idea of international justice that the court is poised to deliver. First, as was the 
case in Uganda, the ICC’s involvement has ambiguous consequences for the 
victims of violence. The people of northern Uganda, especially the Acholi, 
suffered most in Uganda’s civil war but their interest and needs were not well 
served by the ICC.98 It is unclear that ICC prosecutions did much for them 
because it arguably made the violence in the region worse rather than better by 
discouraging LRA militias from agreeing a peace deal. Second, it is not at all 
clear that having figures like Kony stand trial in The Hague serves their interest 
in seeing justice done. Third, the lack of attention to the government’s actions 
and the complicity of international institutions that have funded the 
displacement camps have meant that the underlying conditions that led to 
violence in Uganda have not been addressed.99 
Instead the authority of the state is reaffirmed and the interests of the 
international community are given priority. First, ICC involvement brands the 
LRA leaders as criminals, thereby encouraging and justifying the use of further 
violence to bring those leaders to justice. Second, ICC involvement promotes 
the conception of justice as international accountability rather than local justice 
for those most affected, or peace for that matter. Put another way, the ICC uses 
its moral and legal authority to pursue a vision of justice that is seen as superior 
to that sought by those affected.100 The ICC imports moral norms and models of 
legal efficiency that do seek the participation or knowledge of those involved 
but presume the superiority of international justice, which is itself made 
possible by powerful states. This dynamic risks perpetuating colonial modes of 
domination. The focus on international justice and building the capacity of the 
state tends to not only disempower victims, who are seen as passive, but also to 
portray the LRA as composed of irrational savages and criminals without 
legitimate grievances.101 Further, even as the ICC has privileged the Ugandan 
state, its modes of intervention undermine democratic authority in the country 
by playing into preexisting dynamics of aid dependency, economic and military 
intervention from international community, and the necessity of forms of 
external governance. 
This brief consideration of the ICC’s intervention in Uganda shows that 
there are serious unintended consequences of the court’s pursuit of its moral 
ends. There is definitely some room for improvement as the court becomes 
more adept in its work. For example, the naïveté shown by too readily 
 
 96.  Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 179, 187 (2007) [hereinafter Branch, Uganda’s Civil War]. 
 97.  Hoover, supra note 35, at 257–59. 
 98.  BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 191–94 
 99.  Branch, Uganda’s Civil War, supra note 96, at 181–82. 
 100.  BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 195. 
 101.  Id. at 214–15. 
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embracing the Ugandan government is relatively simple to overcome by being 
more attentive to the benefits that states may be seeking in referring a case to 
the ICC. 
However, there are also more serious problems with the ICC’s pursuit of 
moral ends. At least in Uganda, the court has been shown to be too deferential 
to the interests of states and too inattentive to the victims of violence. This is a 
damning indictment because it undermines the aims and authority of the court. 
There are many ways we can seek to address this problem, but I want to focus 
again on the ICC’s denial of political motivations as a key cause, because this 
denial is contradictory. The court wields political power and must make 
political decisions to achieve its ends, which are not necessarily given in a 
singular or comprehensive way by the court’s founding texts. If this is correct, 
then the court needs to acknowledge the power it has and articulate its ends as a 
political as well as a moral and legal project. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Considering how the ICC claims and exercises its authority to hold 
individuals responsible reveals important limitations upon the court’s capacity 
as a moral actor. Most importantly, the court’s moral authority is premised on 
the distance it maintains from politics by focusing on the impartial application 
of the law in the name of universal principles, but this distance is undermined in 
practice. The court’s inability to maintain an apolitical stance is not simply the 
product of inevitable practical compromise. Rather, this inability reveals 
important problems with how the ICC claims moral authority. First, the ICC, 
like all social institutions pursuing moral ends, is complex and embodies 
multiple ends and divergent projects. Claiming to have a clear moral purpose 
supported by a wide consensus does the ICC no favors, because the practical 
reality is that its actions will be inconsistent at times and that pursuing 
international justice through high-profile trials of individual perpetrators is a 
political project in its own right. Second, the ICC’s claim to represent humanity 
in its pursuit of international justice obscures the partiality of the project. Ideals 
of humanity and justice are defined in particular ways that reflect important 
power inequalities. The ICC serves many interests through such claims, partly 
as a counterhegemonic institution that nonhegemonic states have used as a way 
to bolster their ethical status with respect to hegemonic states like the United 
States, Russia, and China. Also, the ICC serves the interests of powerful states 
by providing further justifications for intervention in the global south, 
particularly in African states. Yet this dynamic is exploited by weaker states, 
which are able to use international attention and support for their own 
purposes. Third and finally, the ICC’s apolitical stance obscures the fact that the 
interests of an international court are not necessarily the same as those of the 
victims of violence that the court claims to represent. This is the most morally 
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troubling limitation of the court because it reflects not only the reality that 
moral aims are always pursued in the real world but also that there may be 
something fundamentally troubling in the ends the court is seeking to realize. 
International justice as an ideal presumes that there are principles and ends 
that are universally desirable, and that the realization of those principles and 
ends requires forms of global authority. This framing will always leave open the 
possibility that the powerful dictate to the weak, and the justifications of law 
and morality cannot alter this, which is why the political mechanisms through 
which international justice is realized are vital. If international justice is actually 
going to be about preventing future violence and serving the needs of victims, 
then it needs to find a way to provide an international level of protection and 
action that includes the knowledge, values and needs of those affected by 
violence. This is the primary critique that a Deweyan analysis leads us to, that 
the ICC, for all its potential, does not enable those subject to violence to exert 
greater control over their lives, and it does not effectively build social 
relationships that reduce the possibility of extreme violence. This happens 
because the court has oriented itself around high-profile prosecutions of 
individuals and has cooperated closely with states. There are real practical 
reasons this is important for the survival of the ICC as an institution, but 
acknowledging the political compromises involved reveals how this undermines 
the court’s stated ends. On this point there is much the court could do by 
reorienting its practice—challenging states that refer cases more directly, being 
concerned with wider conditions that enable violence, and being more aware of 
how states seek to use the court to their benefit. More problematic, however, is 
that the court’s vision of worldwide authority is itself undemocratic and is as 
much about securing the moral and legal authority of centralized global forms 
of power as it is about empowering communities and individuals affected by 
violence. This limitation is much more difficult to overcome, because it is less an 
unintended consequence of the court’s actions and more a consequence of the 
political project that lies behind its stated moral aims. There is not sufficient 
space here to consider how the court might be remade to meet this objection, 
especially because it would have to consider the wider ethos that motivates 
international criminal law as a project. For now, thinking about the 
undemocratic nature of the ICC both in principle and practice should give us 
pause when celebrating the achievements of the court, forcing us to ask the 
question, Who is served by such trials and investigations, and what good comes 
of them? I do not want to suggest that the ICC cannot or has not done 
important work, but rather that there is a limitation built into how the court 
conceives of itself as an actor with the authority to hold others accountable, and 
that we should hold the court itself accountable to standards that are focused on 
the wishes, ideas, and needs of those who suffer, rather than the powerful 
interests that normally define international justice as an ideal. 
 
